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Abstract 
This thesis looks at the relationship between regional integration and the number of conflicts. It 
compares this relationship to the one between two variables that have been shown to have an 
effect on the number of conflicts in other studies: democratic freedom and prosperity. The study 
is conducted using descriptive statistics and statistical analysis with data from various publicly 
available datasets for each of the variables. The dataset for regional integration is compiled based 
on the theoretical framework proposed by Balassa (1962) and uses regional economic integration 
as its basis. 175 countries in five geographical regions are observed over a period of 21 years 
from 1991 to 2011. The study finds that each of the three variables has an effect on the number of 
conflicts, in most, but not all cases the variables have an inverse relationship with the number of 
conflicts. The two control variables have a much more significant effect on the number of 
conflicts than regional integration, with democratic freedom having an effect in all but one 
observed region. Regional integration’s effect on the number of conflicts increased in 
significance over the observed time period. 
Keywords: Regional integration, regionalism, conflict, democratic peace, neoliberalism, 
democracy, prosperity.  
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1. Introduction 
This thesis looks at the effects of regional integration on the prevalence of conflicts. The purpose 
of this thesis is to assess the effects of a change in regional integration on the number of conflicts 
in the countries that make up those regions. In order to conduct a truly comprehensive study, it 
looks at this from a global perspective including as many countries as possible. This study also 
compares and contrasts possible alternative explanations for changes in the number of conflicts in 
a given country. 
Over the course of the last few decades the world has become increasingly integrated, both 
regionally and globally. This integration comes in many forms: the costs of international travel 
have gone down, the rise of the internet has made the sharing of ideas easier than ever before, 
efforts by international organizations have removed barriers to international trade and regional 
political cooperation has given rise to regional political unions. The world around us has shrunk, 
figuratively speaking. While this trend is obvious, its consequences are not? Arguably, there’s no 
better consequence than peace and stability in the form of an absence of armed conflicts. 
Neoliberal Institutionalism argues that states create interdependence between each other through 
political institutions and economic ties (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Furthermore, free trade areas, 
customs unions and economic unions strengthen the economic ties within a region, increasing 
interdependence and raising the costs of potential conflict. 
In order to measure the effects of regional integration, this thesis investigates the correlation 
between the level of integration and the number of conflicts. Does increased integration also 
bring a decrease in armed conflicts or is it better explained by other factors such as increased 
democratization or prosperity? 
Thus, the research question is: To what extent does regional integration affect the prevalence of 
conflicts? To answer this question, this study looks at 175 countries from 1991 to 2011 and 
compares their level of regional integration over time with the number of conflicts in their 
territory using various methods of statistical analysis in order to find out if increased regional 
integration has a measurable effect on the number of conflicts. It also focuses on the level of 
democratization and prosperity in these countries to see if those factors might help better explain 
the number of conflicts. The main argument of this thesis is that increased regional integration 
leads to a measurable decrease in the number conflicts and that decrease is more pronounced than 
that for either prosperity or democratic freedom. 
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This study contains four main chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter is the literature review 
where previous academic research on this and related topics is discussed and summarized. The 
following chapter presents the theoretical framework that outlines the theoretical basis used to 
explain the relationship between variables, it also presents the hypotheses to be tested. The third 
chapter lays out the methodology for gathering and analyzing the data, as well as the variables 
and their operationalization. The last chapter consists of the analysis. In this chapter the data is 
analyzed in two sections, in the first, descriptive statistics are used to establish general trends and 
correlations in the data. Following this, statistical analysis is used to verify the observations made 
in the previous section and the data is further analyzed on a deeper level. The thesis concludes 
with a summary of the main findings, possible avenues of future research and the inherit 
limitations of the study. 
After considering all the data, a correlation is found between increased regional integration and 
an absence of conflict, but this correlation is much less pronounced than those between prosperity 
and democratic freedom and an absence of conflict. A one way correlation is established between 
increased levels of democratic freedom and an absence of conflict. All three hypotheses are 
proven true to a degree, but the data makes hypothesis 2 the strongest out of the three. 
2. Literature Review 
The academic literature on regional integration’s effect on the prevalence of conflicts is largely 
focused on case studies of specific regions and regional organizations. There seems to be a 
distinct lack of large-scale comprehensive and quantitative studies into the relationship between 
the two.  
The most relevant and comprehensive piece of academic literature on the topic of regional 
integration and conflicts is a chapter by Swanström (2005). The first thing he brings up is a 
distinction between conflict management, which most literature focuses on and conflict 
prevention which he feels has not been covered enough. He notes that while international 
organizations like the United Nations are well suited for conflict management, regional 
organizations are better suited for conflict prevention. He finds that regional organizations vary in 
their functioning from region to region. For example, in Western low context cultures (cultures 
where communication is explicit and on a single level), regional organizations tend to be more 
legislation based, with members giving up some sovereignty for everyone’s benefit. In high 
context cultures (cultures where a lot is left unsaid and the choice of words is more important) 
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such as those in Asia, regional organizations tend to be more informal, functioning more as 
forums rather than strict legislative frameworks. This variety makes it difficult to find one easy-
to-measure mechanism by which regional integration helps prevent conflicts. While regional 
economic integration helps prevent conflicts by increasing the costs of conflict through 
interdependence, regional security organizations like OSCE have specific structural mechanisms 
to prevent conflicts and regional political organizations provide mediation and help create what 
Swanström (2005) calls a “culture of prevention” in the region. He concludes by saying that the 
notion of “what works for us should work for them” has been repeatedly proven wrong and that 
each region is different.  
In the rest of the academic literature two main sides emerge, one arguing that regional integration 
(through regional organizations) is beneficial to preventing and resolving conflicts; and another 
arguing that regional organizations are ineffective at preventing or resolving conflicts. 
Adeleke’s (1996) article looks at ECOWAS’ (Economic Community of West African States) 
actions in conflict resolution in East Africa. Its actions have been billed as the first instance of a 
regional organization mounting a military intervention. Even though ECOWAS was little more 
than an economic union at the time, its swift action diffused the situation and established peace. 
Arthur’s (2010) later article looks back at how ECOWAS’ first effort in Liberia helped prepare 
them to deal with future crises in the region. He looks at the cases of Cote d’Ivoire and Togo, 
where ECOWAS was able to diffuse the rising conflicts without much bloodshed. He also makes 
suggestions for other regional organizations.  Similarly, Amer’s (2004) article outlines ASEAN’s 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) acceptance of Vietnam, which lowered tensions in the 
region, provided it with a framework for conflict resolution and solved its border disputes, shows 
regional integration in an extremely positive light. 
Stefanova’s (2006) article looks at the evolution of what in now the European Union as the proto-
regional organizations. He notes that it started as a security mechanism after the Second World 
War to prevent another war in Europe. The European Coal and Steel Community was to create 
interdependence between the larger actors in Europe in a field that was essential to waging war, 
fuel and raw material. Based on European Union’s example, he draws up the evolution of a 
regional integration from economic integration to political and security integration. 
Walraven (1998) doubts the effectiveness of regional organizations in conflict prevention and 
resolution. His article takes a detailed look at the structure and political capacity of organizations 
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set up to prevent conflicts (among other things) and concludes that they lack the institutional 
capacity and political means to fulfill their assigned tasks of conflict prevention and resolution. 
Omorogbe’s (2012)  article looks at the failure of the African Union to act decisively during the 
Libyan Civil War. While another regional organization, the Arab League supported military 
intervention that eventually led to the resolution of the war, the African Union was insisting on a 
diplomatic option, even though they themselves are tasked with maintaining the security in the 
region. This highlights the argument that just any kind of regional integration might not be better 
for resolving conflicts in the region. 
While there is a distinct lack of quantitative studies into regional integration’s effects on conflict, 
there are many studies looking at other factors affecting conflict in states. From this literature two 
major alternatives emerge: the level of democracy in a country and the relative prosperity of the 
population of a country. 
In their book Russett and Antholis (1993) conduct an extensive empirical study on what is 
colloquially known as the Democratic Peace Theory. The main tenant of the theory is that 
democratic states do not wage war with each other and are generally more peaceful than non-
democratic states. Russett and Antholis found a correlation between democracy and an absence of 
conflict after testing extensively for other control variables, Dafoe et al. (2013) found similar 
results in their more recent study. While the theory traditionally only looks at interstate conflict, 
extrapolating it to include intra-state conflicts isn’t too far reaching. This theory is not without its 
critics, from the definition of democracy used (Balci, 2011) to the actual mechanisms of military 
in democracies (Rosato, 2003), but it does highlight a possible alternative variable to test. Thus, 
the first control variable to explain the number of conflicts is the degree of democracy in a given 
country.  
In the criticism of the Democratic Peace Theory, scholars tried to find other explanations for the 
presence or lack of conflict. One major alternative that emerged is based on economy. Mosseau 
(2005) argues that most conflicts between neighboring countries have been between relatively 
poor countries. Going further into this argument Azar Gat looks at possible alternative 
explanations for the causes of war that could contribute to an absence of conflict in a country 
independent of its democracy or the lack thereof. One of his findings is wealth and comfort, Gat 
(2006) argues that throughout history, increased prosperity has made people less willing to endure 
the hardships of war and military service. Oneal and Russett (2003) conducted a large scale study 
to test Immanuel Kant’s theory of universal peace through democracy, trade and international 
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organizations. For their study they use pairs of states over a very long time period. They found 
that increased trade between states does indeed reduce the chance that a conflict will ignite 
between the pair of countries observed. Following from this, the second control variable to 
explain the number of conflicts is relative prosperity.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
Since this research is primarily focused on regional integration through regional 
intergovernmental organizations, customs unions and the like, the theoretical framework needs to 
acknowledge the effects of non-state actors in the international system and look at possible 
interactions between states that would help prevent conflicts. 
Neoliberalism is a theory that does envisage regional organizations as valid actors in the 
international system. It was put together by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977). They argue 
that states create interdependence between each other through various means such as political 
institutions and trade. This interdependence increases the cost of war between states by means of 
cutting vital trade or risking sanctions from an intergovernmental body, making it a less desirable 
option for all involved. 
Neoliberalism presents a response to Neorealism. It is characterized by a focus on absolute gains, 
unlike Neorealism which focused on relative gains (Waltz, 1979). Neoliberals still believe that 
states exist in an anarchic system and focus on states as the primary actors, but they argue that 
long-term co-operation is not only possible, but the best solution for everyone. They also believe 
that there are many different channels that connect states to each other in the international system 
such as economic ties and intergovernmental organizations. They assert that military might is not 
the only instrument to be used in international relations and states can have more motivations for 
acting beyond pure self-interest and survival (Keohane & Nye, 1977). 
As Swanström (2005) points out in his article, the mechanism of conflict prevention is simple for 
regional economic integration. According to his theory, the higher the degree of regional 
integration, the higher the interdependence between countries in that region through economic 
ties. Increased interdependence then leads to higher costs of conflict, which make conflicts less 
likely in the region. Stefanova’s (2006) article suggests that regional integration often starts out as 
economic integration and later develops into deeper integration through political and security 
cooperation. 
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The theory of regionalism explains why states form regional groupings and create institutional 
frameworks to further strengthen those groupings. Karns and Mingst (2010) categorize those 
reasons into two main categories: political and economic. They identify a number of political 
factors. The first of these is power dynamics where one powerful state drives smaller states to 
form a regional grouping either in its interests or against itself. The second is a common identity 
based on shared history, culture or religion. Another political factor is a common ideology based 
on a shared world view such as liberal democracy or communism. They also identify an external 
or internal threat like a powerful hostile state, terrorist group, economic instability, proliferation 
of internal conflicts or humanitarian disaster as a political factor for regional integration. 
Domestic politics is also found to be a factor where political pressure from local or international 
companies or a desire to push through controversial reforms can lead states towards closer 
cooperation. The last political reason identified is effective regional leadership which is necessary 
to start off the regional integration process. The economic factors they identify are much less 
diverse with the main ones are a desire to stimulate inter-regional trade and increase the size of 
the market in order to attract foreign direct investment in the region. They also conclude that 
while regional cooperation often starts with economic cooperation, its primary goals are often 
political and security benefits of cooperation. 
There are many factors driving regionalism in the world, one of which is the desire to stabilize 
and maintain regional peace. As pointed out in the previous section, regional integration can bring 
those desires about in a variety of ways. Because this is a large scale quantitative research, it 
focuses on whether regional integration does indeed bring with it peace and stability in the form 
of fewer conflicts rather than how this is specifically achieved. 
Following from the theory and previous research, the three main hypotheses to be tested are: 
H1: The more regionally integrated a country is, the lower the number of conflicts in the country. 
H2: The more democratic a country is, the lower the number of conflicts in that country. 
H3: The more prosperous a country is, the lower the number of conflicts in that country. 
4. Research Design 
4.1. Methodology 
This paper, using descriptive statistics and statistical analysis, compares data from various 
internationally recognized academic databases (details below) in one that is compiled spcifically 
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for the purposes of this study (due to the lack of a comprehensive database on regional 
integration) to find correlations between the number of conflicts and prosperity, democratic 
freedom and regional integration and test the hypotheses set up previously. 
Using the Freedom in the World Index as the base, all countries that existed between the years 
1991 and 2011 are included in a list. Then, based on the indexes, the number of conflicts, regional 
integration, democracy score and prosperity are added for each country. Following this, the data 
is graphed out using Microsoft’s Excel 2010 in order to find trends and correlations between the 
different variables. 
The data is then transferred to IBM’s SPSS version 19 for further statistical analysis. The number 
of conflicts is recoded into a dummy variable (0 for no conflicts and 1 for at least one conflict) to 
allow for bivariate logistic regression, the other variables are recoded into dummy variables 
(when needed) based on the global average for each variable. GDP is recoded into the natural 
logarithm of its original value in order for it to be statistically comparable to the other values. 
Then bivariate logistic regression is run using the dummy variable for conflicts as the dependent 
variable and logged GDP, democratic freedom score and the level of regional integration as the 
independent variables (Field, 2009). The relevant output is transferred then transferred to a table 
and analyzed further.   
4.2. Case Selection 
In order to get consistent results, only countries that have not changed the size of the territory 
they govern in the observed period are used. Countries that have split or formed a new territorial 
unit inside a country that existed in that territory before are discarded from the data. This is done 
to keep the GDP figures for each country consistent with the specific territory over the whole 
time period.  
The studied time period covers the years from 1991 to 2011. 1991 was chosen as the starting year 
because it gives a sufficiently long timescale to observe trends while being just at the end of the 
last period when a large number of countries gained independence (due to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union) in the third wave of democratization. This is a good balance between not 
discarding too many countries because of territorial changes and having enough data points on the 
timescale. 2011 was chosen as the end year because the latest version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset being used for the dependent variable only has data until the year 2011.  
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Following the parameters set before to get as consistent data as possible, the following countries 
have been discarded out of the 197 in Freedom House’s index used as the basis for the country 
list: Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Slovakia (split in 1993); Ethiopia and Eritrea (split in 
1993); Indonesia and East Timor (split in 1999); Sudan and South Sudan (split in 2011); Serbia & 
Montenegro, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo (split in 2006 and 2008). In addition to those countries 
Andorra, Cuba, Lichtenstein, Monaco, Narau, North Korea, Palau, San Marino and Somalia were 
also discarded because the GDP figures for them were not included in the International Monetary 
Fund’s dataset. This leaves a total of 175 cases over a period of 21 years. 
For more in depth analysis of the data, it has been further divided into five geopolitical regions 
based on the United Nations Regional Groups
1
. These groups are African Group, Asia-Pacific 
Group, Eastern European Group, Latin American and Caribbean Group, Western European and 
Others Group. The special cases of United States, Israel, Turkey, Kiribati and Taiwan have been 
assigned according to their voting block or failing that, their geographical location. This puts 
them respectively to Western European and Others group for the first three, and the Asia and 
Pacific group for the last two. 
4.3. Data Selection 
4.3.1. Conflicts 
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset2 is utilized to 
measure the dependent variable (number of conflicts). The most current version of the dataset, 
first published in 2002, catalogs all armed conflicts from 1946 to 2011. The conflicts are coded 
by their start data and the dataset contains a large amount of data on each conflict. 
The dataset defines armed conflict as:  
“A contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which 
at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths” (Themnér, 2012)  
Battle-related deaths are further defined as  
                                                 
1
 Members of the General Assembly in current regional groups. United Nations. 
http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/gmun/shared/documents/GA_regionalgrps_Web.pdf  
2
Armed Conflict Dataset. Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Uppsala University. 
 http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/  
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“Deaths caused by the warring parties that can be directly related to 
combat over the contested incompatibility. This includes traditional 
battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities (e.g. hit-and-run 
attacks/ambushes) and all kinds of bombardments of military bases, 
cities and villages etc. Urban warfare (bombs, explosions, and 
assassinations) does not resemble what happens on a battlefield, but 
such deaths are considered to be battle-related. The target for the 
attacks is either the military forces or representatives for the parties, 
though there is often substantial collateral damage in the form of 
civilians being killed in the crossfire, indiscriminate bombings, etc. 
All fatalities – military as well as civilian – incurred in such situations 
are counted as battle-related deaths.” (Definitions, Sources… 2005) 
To find this information, the program uses publicly available sources such as news agencies, 
journals, research reports, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and 
information from the warring parties. The independence and transparency of the sources is 
considered paramount and each source is judged according to the context in which it was 
published (Definitions, Sources… 2005). 
In order to extract the information relevant to this paper, a new dataset was compiled a new using 
only relevant information from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. This includes the 
number of conflicts in a given country per year in the time period observed, the number of 
conflicts a given country was the primary combatant and supporting combatant and the type and 
intensity of these conflicts. The dataset identifies four types of conflicts: extrasystemic, where a 
state fights a non-state group outside its own territory; interstate, where two or more states fight 
each other; intrastate, where the state fights one or more non-state groups in its own territory and 
internationalized, where an intrastate conflict is joined by one or more external states. The 
intensity is measured with a binary system with 1 denoting 25-999 battle-related deaths per year 
and 2 denoting more than 1000 battle-related deaths per year (Themnér, 2012). 
4.3.2. Regional Integration 
Unfortunately, there is no a comprehensive dataset that catalogs regional integration. Because of 
this, a new dataset has been compiled to measure regional integration by country. As 
Swanstörm’s (2005) article points out, regional organizations have large variation in their 
structure, aims and function. This makes it difficult to establish a single criterion for comparing 
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regional organizations in different parts of the world. One other problem with measuring regional 
integration in a variety of regional organizations is the difficulty in tracking the membership 
process. In some regional organizations there is certain criteria that needs to be met in order to be 
able to join, while others will accept any countries in the region. Some also have different levels 
of membership from full members to associate members to candidate members.  
Focus on regional integration through economic integration was chosen as the basis in order to 
establish a uniform system of assessing countries’ regional integration. However, this leaves out 
purely political regional organizations; they are too varied in their structure and functions to be 
adequately compared to each other. Regional economic integration also meshes well with 
neoliberalism, because it creates increased interdependence between its members.  
In order to quantify regional economic integration, Balassa’s (1962) Theory of Economic 
Integration is used. It outlines stages of economic integration between states. The stages are as 
follows (from lowest to highest): free trade area, customs union, common market and economic 
union. In order to reflect the current realities in economic integration, two more stages were 
added to this: common market with monetary union and economic union with monetary union. 
This leaves a seven point scale to measure regional integration (from highest to lowest): 0 – no 
integration, 1 – free trade area, 2 – customs union, 3 – common market, 4 – common market with 
monetary union, 5 – economic union, 6 – economic union with monetary union. 
The primary source for collecting data for this dataset is the World Trade Organization’s 
Regional Trade Agreements Information System
3
 which catalogs all trade agreements between 
states since its inception in 1947 as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The RTAIS 
provides the type, year of signing, year of entry into force and the founding members of regional 
trade agreements. Where possible the websites of the regional organizations were employed for 
crosschecking additional details like the years non-founding members joined and possible 
changes in the type of agreement. Only multilateral trade agreements between neighboring 
countries were counted to represent the regional aspect of this paper. States are considered to be 
part of an agreement when it enters into force. When multiple different levels of integration 
overlapped, the highest one was chosen.  
                                                 
3
 Regional Trade Agreements Information System. World Trade Organization. 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx  
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4.3.3. Democracy 
To measure democratic freedom in a country, Freedom House’s Freedom in the world index4 was 
used. This index provides an annual assessment of freedom as experienced by individuals per 
country. This is done in two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. According to 
Freedom House:  
“Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political 
process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in 
legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties 
and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive 
impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil 
liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational 
and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy 
without interference from the state.” 5  
 
These two categories are assessed on a 7 point scale with number 1 representing the most 
freedom and number 7 the least. The scores are compiled by analysts and academic advisors and 
based on news reports, academic analysis, nongovernmental organizations’ reports, think tanks’ 
reports, individual professional contacts and visits to the region.”6 
In order to get one easily comparable score to represent the overall level of democratic freedom in 
the countries, the two scores were added together to create a new combined score that goes from 
2 to 14 with 2 representing the highest degree of freedom and 14 the lowest. This was done this 
for every country observed for the period of 1991 to 2011. 
4.3.4. Prosperity 
In order to measure prosperity, the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook 
2013’s data7 for gross domestic product is utilized. The primary source of the data is national 
governments with international organizations playing a role in harmonizing the methodologies 
and the data (World Economic… 2013). 
                                                 
4
 Freedom in the World Index. Freedom House. http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports  
5
 Freedom in the World Index Methodology. Freedom House.  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology  
6
 Freedom in the World Index Methodology. Freedom House.  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology 
7
 World Economic Outlook. Intenational Monetary Fund.  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/index.htm  
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Per capita purchasing power parity adjusted gross domestic product in Dollars was chosen for the 
purposes of this thesis. Per capita GDP is gross GDP divided by the total population of the 
country (Frank & Bernake, 2003). This allows countries to be better compared to each other, 
despite having vastly different sized populations. Purchasing power parity adjusts the GDP based 
on a weights system which reflects the purchasing power in each country despite changes in 
currency exchange rate and other factors.
8
 This variation of GDP allows comparison of all the 
selected countries’ prosperity on the most equal footing possible. 
5. Analysis 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
5.1.1. Global Trends 
This section looks at the generalized global trends in the gathered data, starting with the average 
number of conflicts per country per year. This is followed by average per capita purchasing 
power parity adjusted GDP, then the average democratic freedom and ending with the average 
level of regional integration over the observed time period. 
Graph 1. The average global number of conflicts per country over time. 
Graph 1 shows that while fluctuating noably, the average number of conflicts per country 
globally is on a downward trend in the 21 years observed in this study. There is a visible increase 
in the amount of conflicts in the early 1990s which could be caused by the conflicts that happened 
                                                 
8
 Frequently Asked Questions. International Monetary Fund. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/faq.htm  
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in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The bump that appears in 2011 
could be attributed to the after effects of the so called Arab Spring in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Despite the average number of conflicts per country increasing towards the end of the 
observed period, the number of conflicts has generally decreased. 
Graph 2. The average global per capita gross domestic product adjusted for purchasing power 
parity in dollars over time. 
As graph 2 indicates, the average global per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity has 
steadily increased to almost double the starting amount over the observed period with the trend 
pointing to further increase. There a noticeable decline in 2008, most likely due to the global 
financial crisis reaching its peak in that year. Following Gat’s (2006) theory of increased 
prosperity leading to fewer conflicts this would mean a steady decrease in conflicts over the 
observed period of time. 
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Graph 3. The average global democratic freedom. The graph has been inverted as a lower score 
indicates more and a high score less democratic freedom over time. 
Graph 3 shows that the average democratic freedom has fluctuated over the observed time period, 
but the overall trend is up. The large drop off in 1992 could be attributed to the newly 
independent countries in Eastern Europe struggling with establishing democracy after decades of 
totalitarian rule. The sharp increase in the first half of the 2000s could be explained by European 
Union’s enlargement and more freedom coming to the Middle East. 
Graph 4. The average global level of regional integration over time. 
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As graph 4 indicates, the average level of regional integration has steadily increased in several 
stages and the general trend is up. The stage by stage increases can be explained by new regional 
organizations coming into existence and therefore increasing the level of integration in multiple 
countries at once or due to existing regional organizations implementing a new policy for all 
members states simultaneously. 
An overview of the global trends shows that the overall average number of conflicts has 
decreased over the observed period of time, futhermore the overall average of each of the 
dependent variables has increased. This result fits with all the set hypothesis and calls for a more 
in-depth analysis of the data. 
5.1.2. Global Correlation 
In this section the global data for all the variables is compared using descriptive statistics in the 
form of graphs to find any significant correlations between them. 
 
Graph 5. The average global level of regional integration and the average global number of 
conflicts per country over time. The scale for regional integration is on the left and the one for 
conflicts is on the right. 
As graph 5 indicates, the average number of conflicts decreases as the average level of regional 
integration increases between the years 1991 and 2001. In the following period the number of 
conflicts remains relatively stable compared to the continued increase in the level of regional 
integration. There seems to be a correlation between the two variables. Keohane and Nye (1977) 
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do not predict a ceiling to the reduction of conflicts in their theory of complex interdependence. 
As the interdependence between states increases, the cost of war between them continues to 
increase making conflict less likely. 
This presents a number of possibilities. The most obvious one is that the correlation in 1991-2001 
due to unmeasured factors or that the effects of regional integration on conflicts is capped at a 
certain level above which it no longer has a noticeable effect. Another explenation may be that 
increased regional integration only affects interstate conflicts and that the relatively stable number 
of conflicts after 2001 is largely made up of intrastate conflicts. There is no obvious reason as to 
why further regional integration would affect the number of intrastate conflicts as the increased 
costs of war as described by Keohane and Nye wouldn’t affect intrastate actors. This will be 
examined further in the thesis.  
Graph 6. The average global per capita gross domestic product adjusted for purchasing power 
parity in dollars and the average global number of conflicts per country over time. The scale for 
GDP is on the left and the one for conflicts is on the right. 
As indicated in graph 6, when average per capita GDP increases, the average number of conflicts 
per country decreases between the years 1991 and 2001. After that, the number of conflicts stays 
relatively stable while GDP continues to grow. It is interesting to note that the drop in GDP 
during the 2008-2009 financial crisis is reflected in a similar drop in the average number of 
conflicts over the same period. Similarly to regional integration, there is only a correlation in the 
20 
 
first half of the observed period. Gat’s (2006) theory that increased prosperity leads to a reduction 
in conflicts cannot thus be conclusively proven or disproven with the data presented.  
The corresponding decrease in both GDP and conflicts is an interesting finding, even though it is 
only present in two data points. It could indicate that there is a one-way relationship between 
GDP and conflicts where a decrease in GDP leads to a decrease in conflicts but not necessarily 
the other way round. 
  
Graph 7. The average global score of democratic freedom and the average number of conflicts 
per country over time. (The scale for democratic freedom has been inverted as a lower score 
indicates more and a higher one less freedom. The scale for the democratic freedom score is on 
the left and the one for conflicts is on the right.) 
As indicated in graph 7, the average level of democratic freedom in the world increases slightly 
as the average number of conflicts first decreases and then remains relatively stable. The small 
changes in democratic freedom over time are not readily apparent because of the nature of the 13 
point scale used for measuring democratic freedom and having to balance the scale at zero. 
Therefore the effects of democratic freedom will be more noticeable at regional level of analysis 
as it differs more using smaller scale. 
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5.1.3 Smaller Levels of Analysis 
5.1.3.1 Many Conflicts vs. No Conflicts 
In this section, the data is scrutinized in more detail. The data has been divided into two separate 
datasets by total number of conflicts over the observed 21-year period. Countries with no 
conflicts have been designated as “no conflicts” and countries with 5 or more conflicts have been 
designated as “many conflicts”. This provides a different nominal look at the variables used in 
this study. 
Graph 8. The average per capita purchasing power parity adjusted GDP over time in dollars for 
countries with no conflicts and countries with many conflicts. 
Graph 8 indicates a clear difference in GDP of countries with no conflicts and those with many 
conflicts. The difference in the nominal value is more than double in favor of countries with no 
conflicts. In addition to the nominal value, the rate of increase is also noticeably faster in the no 
conflict countries. It is also interesting to note that the only noticeable dip in the GDP during the 
2008-2009 financial crisis is much more pronounced in the no conflict countries, being almost 
non-existent in the countries with many conflicts. This could imply that the economies in the no 
conflict countries are much more closely tied to each other than those in the many conflict 
countries. 
There are multiple ways of interpreting this data. One obvious way of looking at it is that 
countries with many conflicts have a much worse climate for economic growth with a significant 
drop in education, a rise in poverty and internal displacement during and after conflicts (Gates et 
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al, 2012). This would explain the lower rate of GDP growth. Another way of looking at it is that 
countries with lower nominal GDP are more likely to have conflicts. As lower GDP would 
indicate a higher prevalence of poverty and unemployment, this would in turn mean a higher 
proportion of young disenfranchised males, who have the highest propensity for aggression and 
conflicts in society (Gat, 2006). This does lead to a chicken-and-egg problem with no clear 
indication of whether a low GDP causes conflicts or conflicts cause a low GDP or both possibly 
in a vicious cycle. There does seem to be a clear correlation between the two in this graph, but the 
limited nature of the observed time period does not allow for clear cause and effect to be 
established. 
Graph 9. The average democratic freedom per country over time in countries with no conflicts 
and countries with many conflicts. The graph has been inverted as a low score denotes a high and 
high score a low level of democratic freedom.  
Graph 9 indicates a noticeable difference in the democratic freedom in countries with no conflicts 
and in those with many conflicts. The average democratic freedom is significantly higher in 
countries with no conflicts compared to those with many conflicts. Interestingly, the average 
democratic freedom has increased slightly in countries with many conflicts while the increase in 
counties with no conflicts is much smaller. The average democratic freedom also fluctuates more 
in countries with many conflicts, this could be the result of the regime turning more authoritarian 
in response to internal or external threats and possible regime changes as a result of a successful 
overthrow of the government. 
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Once again, this data presents two possibilities: either less democratic freedom leads to more 
conflicts or more conflicts lead to less democratic freedom. Oneal and Russett (1999) find that 
democracy has important pacific benefits, as they put it, at least to interstate conflict looking at 
the 1950-1992 period just preceding the one observed in this study. This echoes back to the 
previous section to look at interstate and intrastate conflicts separately.  
There are arguments for either possibility. Less democratic freedom would imply a more 
authoritarian regime, which would have more legal freedom to quell potential conflicts as well as 
the motivation to do so for regime survival before they turn into violent armed conflicts. At the 
same time a more authoritarian regime would face more dissent from a lack of equal political 
representation and oppression. More democratic freedom would allow people to express their 
grievances through elections and public criticism, which many authoritarian regimes do not 
allow.  It is not possible to establish a direct cause and effect relationship between democratic 
freedom and the number of conflicts, but there is correlation between the two.  
Graph 10. The average level of regional integration in countries with no conflicts and countries 
with many conflicts. 
Graph 10 indicates a small, but noticeable difference in the average level of regional integration, 
the difference increases markedly after 2003. Unlike the previous two charts, however, regional 
integration in both countries with no conflicts and countries with many conflicts is nominally 
relatively close and the increases in both observed groups follow each other closely. 
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This would indicate that while there is some correlation between regional integration and 
conflicts, it is nominally smaller than that between conflicts and GDP or democratic freedom. 
One reason for this could be that the other variables have more noticeable and immediate effects 
on the number of conflicts or vica-versa. The level of regional integration goes down very rarely 
during the period observed. One instance of this is Georgia’s withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth of Independent states in response to the 2008 Russia-Georgia War
9
. Another 
such incident happened in 2012 when the South American trade bloc Mercosur suspended 
Paraguay’s membership in response to a coup in the country.10 So while uncommon, the level of 
regional integration is subject to change with conflict and political tensions, in essence hurting the 
country whose level was lowered economically through the interdependence between them. 
The reason why regional integration is more uniform across the two groups more is probably 
because of its institutional nature as opposed to GDP or democratic freedom. GDP especially 
actively reflects the effects of conflicts as production is turned from goods to weapons, a 
significant number of workers stop work to fight or critical infrastructure is damaged (Gat, 2006). 
Democratic freedom reacts similarly with war powers activating and postponing elections or the 
banning of public gatherings in intrastate conflicts. Regional integration in the form of trade 
blocs, however requires an active decision by either the members of the bloc, who risk losing 
economically because of interdependence or the country itself who stands to lose economically as 
well. As the data shows, many of the trade blocs in existence today have come into existence only 
during the observed period and are thus still getting used to the concept. As the recent cases of 
Georgia and Paraguay show, countries are beginning to understand and utilize the institutional 
power of regional organizations to punish unwanted behavior. 
5.1.3.2 Interstate Conflict vs. Intrastate Conflict 
In this section, the conflicts are separated into interstate conflicts, meaning a conflict between one 
or more state actors and intrastate conflicts where the conflict is between a state and one or more 
internal opposition groups (Themnér, 2012). This makes it possible to compare the effects of 
prosperity, democratic freedom and regional integration on these two different kinds of conflicts 
and see if the effects differ based on the nature of the conflict. To make the data clearer, this 
section only looks at countries involved in at least one conflict over the observed time period. 
                                                 
9
 Information on Georgia's withdrawal from CIS. (18. August 2009). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 
http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=95&info_id=10783  
10
 Paraguay suspended from Mercosur. (30. June 2012). The Guardian 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/30/paraguay-suspended-mercosur  
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Graph 11. The average number of interstate and intrastate conflicts per country over time in 
countries with conflicts. 
As graph 11 shows, there is a large discrepancy in the number of interstate conflicts compared to 
the number of intrastate conflicts. In the beginning of the observed period interstate conflicts 
represent about 13% of all conflicts, by the end of the observed period, they represent 22%. The 
number of interstate conflicts has remained relatively stable over the observed period; the 
increase in their proportion of all conflicts comes from the decrease in intrastate conflicts. 
Comparing graph 11 to graph 1 shows that the decrease in conflicts up to the early 2000s came 
primarily from a decrease in intrastate conflicts. 
These findings are very interesting as they directly contradict Keohane and Nye’s (1977) theory 
of interdependence between states increasing the cost of conflict between two countries to the 
point of making non-violent options preferable. According to their theory, there should be a 
noticeable decrease in the number of interstate conflicts as opposed to the number of intrastate 
conflicts as the average level of regional integration increases. Obviously this doesn’t invalidate 
the theory as such, as there could be other factors affecting the variables. It is an interesting 
finding though. 
The simplest possible explanation for this contradiction is that the observed time period is too 
short to notice any long term trends in the number of interstate conflicts. It is possible that 
interdependence through other, harder to measure means such as bilateral trade has already 
lowered the number of interstate conflicts to its minimum and what’s left are the outliers to the 
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general trend. In their comprehensive study of the causes of peace between pairs of states from 
1885-1992 Oneal et al. (2003) conclude that along with democracy and membership in 
international organizations, increased bilateral trade has an effect on the lack of conflicts between 
states. Because their study focuses on a much longer period of time and has very little overlap 
with the period used in this study, the conclusions aren’t necessarily universally applicable. The 
number of intrastate conflicts has increased notably between 1900 and 2012 while the number of 
interstate conflicts has decreased slightly (Human Security Report, 2012), this does support my 
theory that the reduction in interstate conflicts due to interdependence has already had its main 
effect and that interdependence alone won’t stop interstate conflicts completely. 
The questions that remain are: what caused the decline in intrastate conflicts in the 1991- 2001 
period and why has it remained relatively stable after that. The next chapter might be able to 
answer these questions. 
5.2. Statistical Analysis 
In this section, the data is further analyzed using statistical analysis, specifically binary logistic 
regression. Statistical analysis provides more concrete points of comparison of the data available, 
making the results easier to compare and contrast. It also allows for easier comparison of data by 
region. The aim of this section is to confirm the findings from the previous part of this chapter 
using concrete replicable scientific methods and analyze the data in ways not possible using 
descriptive statistics. 
The data in table 1 indicates a large degree of variance in the three independent variables over the 
five observed geographical regions. Because of the coding of the conflict variable a negative 
result indicates a positive correlation between that variable and a reduction in conflicts. This is 
true in all cases except for the freedom variable which is inverted and thus a positive result 
indicates a positive correlation and a reduction in conflicts. 
Table 1 shows that all three variables had a significant effect on the presence or absence of 
conflicts, regional integration was slightly less significant than the other two, but still significant 
to the second degree of significance. Each of the variables follows the hypotheses set up: as GDP 
and regional integration go up, the chance of conflict goes down and as the value of democratic 
freedom goes up the chance for conflict goes up as the variable is inverted. Out of the three 
variables, GDP had the largest impact on conflicts followed by democratic freedom and then 
regional integration. The R-squared value of 0.142 for the whole model including all cases is not
  
 
 
Statistical Analysis of Conflict by Region 1991-2011 
 All Africa Asia-Pacific Eastern Europe Latin America Western Europe & Other 
 B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds  
Ratio 
GDP 
(logged) 
-0.348(0.045)*** 0.706 -0.526(0.095)*** 0.591 -0.690(0.087)*** 0.501   0.725(0.430) 2.064  1.106(0.333)** 3.023  -2.305(1.842) 0.100 
Freedom  0.139(0.015)*** 1.150 0.320(0.037)*** 1.378 -0.034(0.025) 0.966  0.466(0.085)*** 1.593    0.819(0.109)*** 2.269   1.478(0.457)** 4.386 
Integration -0.100(0.037)** 0.905 -0.022(0.058) 0.978 -0.078(0.151) 0.925 -0.046(0.151) 0.955     0.325(0.143)* 1.384  -0.452(0.242) 0.636 
Constant  0.102(0.422) 1.107 -0.724(0.739) 0.485  4.620(0.780)*** 101.467 -12.199(3.929)** 0.000 -17.790(3.477)*** 0.000 16.422(18.798) 13551400.66 
 R2 0.142 0.205 0.130 0.293 0.325 0.783 
N 3654 1029 1071 378 672 504 
Sig. <0.05 = *; <0.01**; <0.001*** 
Table 1. Binary logistic regression of conflicts with GDP (logged), democratic freedom and regional integration as the independent variables separated by region.  
  
 
 
very high, but considering the large number of cases and the potential for other unmeasured 
variables, it is not bad. 
As discussed in the previous section, prosperity as measured by GDP is the variable most readily 
reactive to conflicts. The statistical analysis lends further credence to this assertion as do Gates et 
al. (2012) in their article. The fact that prosperity works as a predictor for conflicts also indicates 
that countries with a low prosperity are more likely to experience conflicts. This is also the view 
of Keen (1998), who argues that violence through armed militias becomes an important source of 
income in impoverished countries and Kaufmann (1999) who argues that poverty is an important 
part in the radicalization of youth in the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s. 
Both democratic freedom and regional integration also had significant effects on predicting the 
presence or absence of conflict. This correlates with similar findings in the descriptive statistics, 
especially for democratic freedom. Regional integration having an effect helps lend some strength 
to the main argument that it is a factor in helping to prevent conflicts. The possible mechanisms 
for this have already been discussed in the previous section.  
Going just by the statistical data for all countries, all the hypotheses have been proven to a 
degree, however prosperity in the form of GDP is a much better predictor of an absence of 
conflicts than either democratic freedom or regional integration, making the main argument of 
this thesis true, but also disproving its value as a predictor of conflict over prosperity. To get a 
more accurate picture of the effects of different variables, the data is further analyzed by 
geographical regions to account for the vast historical and cultural differences present in different 
regions. 
5.2.1. Statistical Analysis by Region 
5.2.1.1. Africa 
In the first of the five observed regions, Africa, the data follows the template set by the global 
analysis with some noticeable differences. As table 1 shows, regional integration is not a 
significant predictor of an absence of conflict in Africa. As with the global data, prosperity and 
democratic freedom are both significant predictors of an absence of conflicts, in the same order. 
However, in Africa both have a bigger impact on predicting the lack of conflicts. The R-squared 
value for Africa is slightly higher than that for all countries, being able to correctly predict one 
fifth of the conflicts. 
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Africa is a large continent with many different cultures and a large variety in all the data observed 
across the region. The reason why regional integration doesn’t have a significant impact on the 
absence of conflicts there may be because, while the average level of regional integration is quite 
high, at times even above the global average, the integration is very spotty, often concentrated in 
very well integrated blocs of countries in South-East and West Africa with many countries not 
integrated at all between them. The lack of political will is also cited as an issue in African 
regional development by an OECD report (Regional Integration in Africa, 2002).  
The reason prosperity has a larger effect on conflicts than the global baseline could be because of 
Africa’s already low average GDP (lowest of the five regions) helps highlight the African 
countries with higher GDP that should have fewer conflicts as discussed before. The most 
interesting find for Africa was that more democratic freedom is also an important predictor of a 
lack of conflicts, more than twice as good as it was in the global baseline. This finding helps 
strengthen the hypothesis for democratic freedom’s effect on reducing conflicts and supports the 
democratic peace theory presented by Russett and Antholis (1993). In fact, it might even expand 
the theory and make a case for it applying to intrastate conflicts as well as interstate conflicts. 
This finding could be explained by a sufficient level of representation and freedom of expression 
having an effect in reducing armed rebel groups who might otherwise have no other way of 
achieving their political goals. Hegre et al. (2001) find that fully democratic states are less likely 
to experience civil conflicts, which coincides with my findings. 
5.2.1.2. Asia-Pacific 
In the Asia-Pacific region the data differs significantly from the global baseline. As indicated in 
table 1 the only significant variable for predicting an absence of conflict is prosperity and its 
chance to predict that is almost double of the global baseline. Neither regional integration nor 
democratic freedom had a significant effect on predicting the absence of conflicts. The R-square 
of the model for the Asia-Pacific is also the lowest of all six models, including the global baseline 
indicating that there might be other significant unmeasured variables to consider. 
Interestingly enough, prosperity being the only variable with a significant effect on predicting 
conflicts coincides with regional power China’s concept of “Asian values” and human rights as a 
collective right to social stability and steady economic growth.
11
 Regional integration not playing 
an important role could be explained by Swanström’s (2005) argument that high context cultures 
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 Building harmonious society crucial for China's progress: Hu. (27. June 2005). The People’s Daily. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/27/eng20050627_192495.html  
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such as that in Asia prefer to not have strict legislative frameworks but rather more informal 
forums (as indicated by a lower regional integration score) where to discuss regional issues. 
Going by these two concepts, the focus on economic growth and stability over human rights 
(including civil liberties) and giving a different priority to regional integration leave prosperity as 
the only viable predictor out of the three variables tested. It might also imply that there’s some 
truth behind that model, if only in that specific region. 
5.2.1.3. Eastern Europe 
Like Asia-Pacific, the Eastern Europe region differs also significantly from the global baseline. 
As shown in table 1, the only significant variable in that region for predicting an absence of 
conflict is democratic freedom. Neither prosperity nor regional integration had a significant 
chance at predicting the absence conflicts. The R-square for the whole model is the highest out of 
the ones observed this far being correct at predicting the absence of conflicts nearly one time out 
of three. 
It is interesting that the results for different regions show such variety compared to the global 
baseline. Democratic freedom being the only significant predictor for Eastern Europe does make 
a certain amount of sense. Most of Eastern European countries start as newly independent 
countries or as countries recovering from Soviet Union’s political and economic influence in the 
beginning of the observation period. Their success is often measured by how well they’ve 
managed to adapt to a democratic political system. One could argue that most of Eastern Europe 
was in a relatively similar position in terms of economy and integration in 1991 which is the first 
year covered in this study. As Mishler and Rose (1996) argue, democratic freedom was the first 
step on the way to a stable country and further economic prosperity and enfranchisement of all 
societal groups. Thus it follows that democratic freedom would be an important predictor of the 
absence of conflicts in this region. 
5.2.1.4. Latin America 
As table 1 shows, Latin America presents some interesting data that differs significantly from the 
other regional data observed. All three variables are significant to a degree at predicting conflicts 
or the absence thereof, however, and increase in prosperity corresponds with an increase in the 
chance of conflict and so does regional integration, although to a lesser degree. Democratic 
freedom is the only variable that has a positive effect on predicting the absence of conflict; it is 
also the most significant one out of the three. The R-squared value for Latin America is the 
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second highest of all observed models, being only behind Western Europe & Other and correctly 
predicting conflict or the absence thereof one time out of three. 
The results for Latin America paint a much different picture than that in any of the other regions: 
both prosperity and regional integration predict the presence of conflicts to a degree which 
democratic freedom very strongly predicts the absence of conflicts. It’s hard to tell whether Latin 
America is an outlier in this case whether there is some fundamental difference in that region not 
only disproving the two hypotheses for that region, but also inverting them. The mechanisms for 
democracy affecting the absence of conflicts has been covered previously and the same should be 
appropriate here. One reason why prosperity could have a different effect in Latin America could 
be the very high degree of income inequality in the region, comparable only to Africa and it’s 
much more uniform in Latin America.
12
 This could indicate that while GDP is going up, the 
prosperity is distributed increasingly unequally in the society and create social unrest through 
poverty and disenfranchisement which could culminate in conflict (Kaufmann, 1999).  
The reason regional integration has a positive correlation with conflicts is even harder to explain, 
however the correlation is of the lowest applicable degree of significance, surpassed by both 
prosperity and democratic freedom. One possible explanation for this is that Latin America’s 
regional integration is comparatively stable over the course of the observed period and its 
integration is also very uniform when compared to Africa for example (Ruiz-Dana et al, 2007). 
This could mean that conflicts happened despite the presence of regional integration and the 
result disproves the hypothesis for regional integration reducing the number of conflicts or that 
regional integration fueled tensions between states and lead to more conflict. This does echo 
Swanström’s (2005) closing remark that each region is different and what works in one might not 
necessarily work somewhere else. 
5.2.1.5. Western Europe & Other 
The Western Europe & Other region once again differs from the global baseline as shown in table 
1. The only significant variable for that region is democratic freedom, interestingly enough as was 
the case with Eastern Europe. For Western Europe & Other the significance is smaller, but the 
chance to predict the absence of conflict is notably larger. Neither prosperity nor regional 
integration had any significant effect on predicting the presence or absence of conflicts for this 
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 GINI Coefficient data by country or region. The World Bank. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/countries/1W?page=3&display=default  
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region. The R-squared value for the model is by far the highest of all observed data, being able to 
predict the absence of conflicts in almost four cases out of five. 
Democratic freedom is the only significant variable for predicting the absence of conflict in the 
region. This adds further credence to the democratic peace hypothesis, especially when 
considering the very high accuracy of this particular model. It should be noted that the region is 
the most prosperous and regionally integrated out of the five observed, so it may be that differing 
levels of democratic freedom is the only variable that changes in the region over the observed 
time period. The reasons as to why democratic freedom is the only significant predictor of the 
absence of conflict are hard to pinpoint in this case, but the data presents a clear correlation 
between the two and not the others. 
5.2.2. Comparison of the First and Second Decades 
As the preliminary results of the previous section show, there were some noticeable differences 
between different variables for the first and second half of the observed period. Notably, the 
number of conflicts decreased steadily in the first half and remained stable in the second half of 
the 21 year period. A similar, but less pronounced phenomenon was also observed with the 
democratic freedom variable. In order to further analyze this discrepancy, the data has been split 
into two for the first and second half of the observed period and compared using logistic 
regression. 
Comparison of tables 2 and 3 shows some notable differences between the two time periods. 
However, the most striking thing in both tables is that Western Europe & Other doesn’t yield any 
significant predictors for conflicts in either period. One possible explanation may be that region 
already had a small number of conflicts for the number of cases observed and effectively 
reducing it by half reduced the significance of the date into obscurity. For this reason, the 
Western Europe & Other region is ignored for this subsection. 
One difference between the two periods that is readily noticeable is that the R-squared value is 
higher in all but one of the models in the 1991-2001 period. This could be explained by that 
period having a larger amount of conflicts as observed previously in the descriptive statistics 
section. Another difference is that regional integration becomes a significant predictor of the 
absence of conflicts in the second half of the observed period while not having a significant effect 
in the first half. This could be explained by the fast growth of regional integration in the second 
half of the time period and possibly its long term effects carrying over from the first half of the 
observed period as Stefanova (2006) argued based on the European Community example. 
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The majority of the regional indicators remained relatively similar over the two observed periods, 
especially for Africa and Asia-Pacific. There were some changes in the Eastern European and 
Latin American regions, however. In Eastern Europe democratic freedom remained the most 
significant predictor of the absence of conflict throughout both periods, but interestingly enough 
in the first period prosperity also had a measurable effect on predicting conflicts. This mirrors the 
findings for Latin America in table 1. An explanation for this could be new states having to deal 
with radical restructuring of their economies which led to large-scale corruption and wealth 
inequality in many post-communist societies (Karklins, 2002). It could be implied that prosperity 
is no longer a significant predictor of conflict in the second period because the problem of 
corruption and inequality has been remedied, at least to a degree. 
The case of Latin America remains an interesting outlier as it was also in table 1. Similarly to 
previous findings, prosperity predicts conflict rather than its absence in that region. However, its 
significance decreases over the two time periods, which coincides with wealth inequality staying 
at a steady level over the first period and slowly declining over the second
13
 Another anomaly for 
Latin America was regional integration predicting conflict, this is clearly the case for the first 
time period, but not in the second one where regional integration is not a significant variable. A 
specific case study of the region would be necessary to investigate this specific anomaly in the 
data. Unfortunately this does not fit in the scope of this study, further study on this subject would 
be recommended. 
Throughout the regional data, two variables remain prominent for predicting the absence of 
conflicts: prosperity and democratic freedom with democratic freedom being a significant 
predictor in a few more cases. It should also be noted that while democratic freedom predicted an 
absence of conflict in every case it was significant, prosperity was a significant predictor of both 
conflict and an absence of conflict over a number of different regions. The only noticeable change 
in global data was the emergence of regional integration as a significant predictor of an absence 
of conflict in the second period, albeit not as significant as prosperity or democratic freedom. It is 
hard to draw a connection between the increased significance of regional integration and the 
stabilization of the number of conflicts over the whole time period. Another more minor change 
was in the accuracy of prosperity being able to predict conflicts or their absence, which could 
indicate that there is a gap on the effect that prosperity has  
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 GINI Coefficient data by country or region. The World Bank. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/countries/1W?page=3&display=default  
  
 
 
Bivariate Logistic Regression of Conflict by Region 1991-2001 
 All Africa Asia-Pacific Eastern Europe Latin America Western Europe & Other 
 B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds  
Ratio 
GDP 
(logged) 
-0.475(0.066)*** 0.622 -0.595(0.140)*** 0.552 -0.854(0.135)***   0.426  1.730(0.652)** 5.642 1.882(0.568)** 6.566 -1.714(1.992) 0.180 
Freedom  0.139(0.021)*** 1.150 0.349(0.050)*** 1.418 -0.069(0.036)   0.933  0.686(0.159)*** 1.987 1.100(0.181)*** 3.003  0.956(0.523) 2.602 
Integration -0.014(0.060) 0.986 0.016(0.098) 1.017 -0.295(0.197)   0.744 -0.196(0.247) 0.822   0.987(0.283)*** 2.682 -0.344(0.251) 0.709 
Constant  0.983(0.600) 2.672 -0.520(1.064) 0.595  6.087(1.155)*** 439.974 -21.968(6.359)** 0.000 -27.182(6.112)*** 0.000 11.817(20.354) 135596.426 
 R2 0.170 0.241 0.173 0.321 0.479 0.655 
N 1914 539 561 198 352 264 
Sig. <0.05 = *; <0.01**; <0.001*** 
Table 2. Bivariate logistic regression of conflicts by region with GDP (logged), democratic freedom and regional integration as the independent variables for the period of 1991-2001. 
Bivariate Logistic Regression of Conflict by Region 2002-2011 
 All Africa Asia-Pacific Eastern Europe Latin America Western Europe & Other 
 B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B(S.E.) 
Odds  
Ratio 
GDP 
(logged) 
-0.230(0.064)*** 0.794 -0.426(0.134)** 0.653 -0.576(0.130)*** 0.562  0.170(0.925) 1.185   1.093(0.493)* 2.984 -3.240(13340.960) 0.039 
Freedom  0.138(0.022)*** 1.148 0.271(0.055)*** 1.311  0.026(0.039) 1.027  0.388(0.104)*** 1.474  0.632(0.149)*** 1.882 10.086(2910.684) 24.005.838 
Integration -0.169(0.050)** 0.844 0.005(0.088) 1.005 -0.249(0.217) 0.780  0.342(0.263) 1.408  -0.039(0.233) 0.962  -2.822(1209.207) 0.060 
Constant -0.699(0.620) 0.497 -1.113(1.062) 0.328  3.447(1.190)** 31.406 -8.147(8.214) 0.000 -15.217(5.083)** 0.000  -6.044(139979.015) 0.002 
 R2 0.116 0.133 0.117 0.381 0.197 1.000 
N 1740 490 512 180 320 240 
Sig. <0.05 = *; <0.01**; <0.001*** 
Table 3. Bivariate logistic regression of conflicts by region with GDP (logged), democratic freedom and regional integration as the independent variables for the period of 2002-2011.
  
 
 
on conflict and as prosperity increases over time, its effects on conflict diminish. Again, further 
study over a longer time period would be required to prove or disprove this theory. 
5.2.3. Further Relationships Between the Variables 
As the last object of analysis, this subsection explores any otherwise unnoticed interaction 
between the variables. This is accomplished through bivariate logistic analysis with each of the 
remaining variables as the dependent variables and the rest as independent variables. The purpose 
of this analysis is to find if any of the variables has a significant predicting effect for any other. 
Only global data is used for this subsection because regional data is not necessary for establishing 
these interactions. 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 show that all the variables have some relationship with one another. Almost all 
the variables have some significant effect on predicting the others. This may be inevitable when 
using empirical real world data of large systemic processes like GDP or regional integration. 
The most accurate model by the R-squared value is the one for predicting GDP. As table 4 shows, 
the results largely match observations made earlier with conflict having a very significant chance 
of predicting a low GDP while democratic freedom and integration predict a high GDP. The 
relationship between GDP and conflicts has been discussed previously (page 28). A higher level 
of regional integration predicting higher prosperity goes back to Keohane and Nye’s (1977) 
theory of interdependence between states. While having the effect of increasing the costs of 
conflict between states, increased trade also has an effect of increasing prosperity through 
comparative advantage as explained by Ruiz-Dana et al. (2007) in their case study of South 
America. In their study dedicated to finding the effects of democracy on economic growth. 
Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) found a similar correlation between the two, corroborating my 
findings. 
Moving on to the model for predicting the level of democratic freedom, an interesting observation 
is the number of conflicts is not a significant predictor of democratic freedom, while the opposite 
is true as seen in table 5. This indicates a one-way causal relationship between the two, helping 
confirm the second hypothesis. It should also be noted that this is the only variable not significant 
in tables 4, 5 and 6. High prosperity and regional integration both predict a high level of 
democratic freedom, but prosperity does so to a higher degree. The correlation between 
prosperity and democratic freedom was already established in the previous paragraph. The 
positive effect of regional integration is indeed interesting. Anderson (1999) explores its effects in 
  
 
 
     Table 4. Bivariate logistic regression of GDP (logged) 
with conflicts, democratic freedom and regional 
integration as the independent variables over the period 
of 1991 to 2011. 
  
Bivariate Logistic Regression of Freedom 1991-2011 
 All   
 B(S.E.) Odds Ratio     
GDP (logged) -0.791(0.035)***      0.453     
Conflicts  0.102(0.071)      1.108     
Integration -0.149(0.024)***      0.862     
Constant  6.934(0.300)*** 1026.771     
 R2 0.287   
N 3654   
Sig. <0.05 = *; <0.01**; <0.001*** 
Bivariate Logistic Regression of GDP 1991-2011 
 All   
 B(S.E.) Odds Ratio     
Conflicts -0.465(0.084)*** 0.628     
Freedom -0.252(0.011)*** 0.777     
Integration  0.199(0.025)*** 1.220     
Constant 1.576(0.096)*** 4.835     
 R2 0.308   
N 3654   
Sig. <0.05 = *; <0.01**; <0.001*** 
Table 5. Bivariate logistic regression of democratic 
freedom with conflicts, GDP (logged) and regional 
integration as the independent variables over the period of 
1991 to 2011. 
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Bivariate Logistic Regression of Integration 1991-2011 
 All   
 B(S.E.) Odds Ratio     
GDP (logged)  0.298(0.039)*** 1.348     
Freedom -0.122(0.013)*** 0.885     
Conflicts -0.493(0.126)*** 0.611     
Constant -2.849(0.384)*** 0.058     
 R2 0.148   
N 3654   
Sig. <0.05 = *; <0.01**; <0.001*** 
Table 6. Bivariate logistic regression of regional 
integration with conflicts, GDP (logged) and democratic 
freedom as the independent variables over the period of 
1991 to 2011. 
  
 
 
depth based on the European Union and South American example. He finds that regional 
integration is a double edged sword as he puts it. One hand it strengthens civil liberties, but on the 
other hand it undermines democratic institutions by consolidating power in regional 
organizations. As the methodology does not yet take the latter into account, this is not reflected in 
the results of the analysis, but would certainly make an interesting topic for further study. 
In the model for predicting regional integration, table 6 shows that all the observed variables had 
a significant chance at predicting the level of regional integration. High prosperity and democratic 
freedom predicted a high level of regional integration while a large number of conflicts predicted 
a low level of regional integration. The relationship between conflicts and regional integration 
indicates that the presence of conflicts makes regional integration less likely. This could be 
explained by governments involved in active conflicts having much of their focus trained on 
those conflicts rather than further regional integration. Another explanation may be that regional 
organizations refuse or are less likely to admit countries involved in active conflicts. This too 
would be an interesting topic for a future study, but does unfortunately not fit within the scope of 
this one. 
6. Conclusion 
After thorough analysis of the data using first descriptive statistics to observe any trends and 
correlations, and then statistical analysis to confirm these observations, all three hypotheses have 
been proven to a degree. There are however some important caveats to consider before looking at 
the results of this study. The first and foremost is that while there are three hypotheses, the main 
argument of the thesis is that regional integration has a measureable inverse relationship with the 
number of conflicts that is greater than those for the control variables of prosperity or democratic 
freedom. While regional integration had a measurable correlation with the number of conflicts 
globally, this correlation was not reflected in the regional data. One positive trend in regards to 
regional integration did emerge from comparing the first and second half of the observed time 
period separately. The impact of regional integration’s inverse effect on the number of conflicts 
increased noticeably over the two periods. This could mean that regional integration is having an 
increased effect on the number of conflicts as the level of regional integration increases over time. 
Prosperity and democratic freedom had much more significant effects on the number of conflicts; 
with democratic freedom having an effect in more cases while prosperity had a stronger effect 
both globally and regionally. However, the main difference between the two variables is that 
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prosperity had both positive and negative effects on the presence of conflicts that differed by 
region and time period. This suggests that either a different variable should be used to measure 
prosperity or the one used should be further augmented to take into account the effects of 
inequality in the distribution of wealth.  
Democratic freedom had a measurable effect on the absence of conflict in all cases except for 
one, making it the best variable out of the three tested for predicting the absence of conflict. 
Furthermore, it is the only variable that has a one-way correlation with the absence of conflicts. 
All other variables tested positive for two-way correlation in the tests meaning that a direct cause 
and effect relationship could not be established.  
The large number of countries used for this study makes the results very generalizable, at least in 
the observed time period. More than 88% of the countries currently in existence are represented 
in the data. The methods used are transparent and the data is publicly available and verifiable for 
replicating the results. Democratic freedom is the best predictor for the absence of conflict in all 
geographic regions observed, except for Asia-Pacific. Since the smallest level of analysis used in 
this study is the state level, the methodology may not be applicable for smaller levels of analysis. 
Based on the results, promoting democratic values and civil liberties should be the top priority for 
every country or organization striving for peace and stability in the world. As prosperity is also an 
important predictor for democratic freedom, promoting international trade would also help 
achieve this goal, but shouldn’t be promoted at the expense of democracy as prosperity can also 
increase the number of conflicts under specific circumstances. Regional integration should 
certainly not be ignored or left aside as it does contribute to both democratic values and peace, it 
should not be prioritized over democracy, but rather alongside it. 
Nevertheless, there are several important limitations to take into account when considering the 
results of this study. Firstly, its large scope allows for generalizability but it also doesn’t take into 
account unique localized factors like a country’s ethnic makeup or geographical oddities that may 
affect the results. A smaller study following similar methodology should try to identify such 
factors to get more accurate results. 
Another thing to consider is the coding of the regional integration variable. It is entirely based on 
regional integration through economic integration, because a theoretical framework for 
categorizing countries by regional economic integration already existed. A potentially important 
facet of regional integration that was omitted is regional political integration through purely 
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political organizations like the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe or the 
African Union. Establishing a framework for measuring levels of regional political integration 
would allow for much more comprehensive study of the effects of regional integration. 
Lastly, the use of public datasets always brings concerns about the accuracy of the data therein. 
The datasets used in this study have transparent methodologies for collecting data, but of special 
concern is the Freedom in the World Index. This index uses a team of analysts to answer a set of 
questions about each country, making the results intrinsically subjective as the analysts have most 
likely changed over the 40 years that the index has been in existence. Some possible problems 
may affect any dataset, such as various inaccuracies resulting from changing methodology or 
measurement errors. The large scope of this study should help mitigate for those factors. 
During the course of this study several interesting findings came up that did not fit within the 
scope of this one. They will be highlighted here as avenues for future research. The most 
perplexing findings were the results of statistical analysis of the Latin America region. It stood 
out by having high prosperity and regional integration predict the presence of conflicts rather than 
their absence. An in depth case study of the region with a control for wealth inequality would be 
required to explain those anomalies in the statistics. 
Another finding requiring further study is the decrease in the number of conflicts over the first 
half of the observed 1991-2011 period and stabilization in the number of conflicts over the 
second half. This phenomenon could not be adequately explained with the data used in this study 
suggesting that there may be some other factors involved. 
An increase in the significance of regional integration for predicting the absence of conflicts 
suggests that its effect on conflicts is increasing. A further study with a similar focus as this one 
conducted in the future would help prove or disprove this theory. 
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